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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
DANIEL MATERA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., 
Defendant. 
 
Case No. 15-CV-04062-LHK    
 
ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY 
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENT 
Re: Dkt. No. 62 
 
 
 Plaintiffs Daniel Matera and Susan Rashkis (“Plaintiffs”) sue Defendant Google Inc. 
(“Google” or “Defendant”) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. 
Pen. Code § 630, et seq., and violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“Wiretap 
Act” or “ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq.  Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for 
preliminary approval of class action settlement.  ECF No. 62 (“Mot.”).  The Court held a hearing 
on this motion on March 9, 2017.  Having considered Plaintiffs’ motion, the arguments of counsel 
at the March 9, 2017 hearing, and the record in this Case, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for 
preliminary approval of class action settlement. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a 
Case 5:15-cv-04062-LHK   Document 71   Filed 03/15/17   Page 1 of 6
 2 
Case No. 15-CV-04062-LHK    
ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).  “The 
purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members of the class from unjust or unfair 
settlements affecting their rights.”  In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 
2008).  Accordingly, in order to approve a class action settlement under Rule 23, a district court 
must conclude that the settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.”  Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).   
II. DISCUSSION 
 Google intercepts, scans, and analyzes the content of emails sent by non-Gmail users for 
the purpose of creating user profiles of Gmail users to create targeted advertising for Gmail users.
1
  
This fact is not disclosed in Google’s operative Privacy Policy or Terms of Service.2  In fact, 
neither document mentions non-Gmail users at all.  Matera v. Google, Inc., 2016 WL 5339806, at 
*18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (noting Google’s operative Terms of Service and Privacy Policy 
“make[] no mention of non-Gmail users”).  Moreover, the parties’ class action settlement for 
which they seek preliminary approval from the Court fails to require Google to disclose this 
information.  See ECF No. 62-1 (“Settlement Agreement”).  The settlement provides for only an 
injunction, a release of the class’s claims, and a request for $2.2 million in attorney’s fees.  See id. 
at ¶¶ 34, 58.  
 In support of the settlement, Plaintiffs contend that the injunction will bring Google into 
compliance with the Wiretap Act and the CIPA.  Mot. at 4.  Further, Plaintiffs state that the 
settlement will provide a notice to the class that provides sufficient disclosures to the class of 
Google’s email scanning practices.  See ECF No. 70 (“H’rg Tr.”), at 3.  The notice to which 
Plaintiffs refer is notice that Plaintiffs are required to provide the class in order to obtain final 
                                                 
1
 Currently, the record is not entirely clear on whether and when Google intercepts, scans, or 
analyzes outgoing emails sent from Gmail users to non-Gmail users.  See ECF No. 62-1 
(“Settlement Agreement”), at ¶ 34.c (noting that “Google will refrain,” rather than “eliminate” any 
processing of outgoing email sent by Gmail users (emphasis added)).  
2
 The Court’s September 23, 2016 order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s motion 
to dismiss based on lack of standing analyzed Google’s April 14, 2014 Terms of Service and 
December 19, 2014 Privacy Policy.  At the March 9, 2017 hearing, the parties confirmed that 
those are the operative documents on this issue.  H’rg Tr. at 3. 
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approval of the class action settlement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice 
in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal”); ECF No. 62-
1 (“Notice”).  This proposed class settlement notice states the following: 
In the settlement, Google has agreed to insure that all incoming 
email to Gmail users and all outgoing email from Gmail users is 
processed in a manner that plaintiffs and Class Counsel agree does 
not violate CIPA or the Wiretap Act.  Specifically, (1) for incoming 
email, Google will eliminate any processing of email content that it 
applies prior to the point when the Gmail user can retrieve the email 
in his or her mailbox using the Gmail interface (currently, this 
occurs when the email is stored in the “Tingle” server) that is used 
for the distinct purpose of advertising and creating advertising user 
models; (2) with regard to any information generated by other 
processing of email content that Google applies before the Gmail 
user can retrieve the email in his or her mailbox using the Gmail 
interface, Google will not use or access such information for the 
purpose of serving targeted advertisements or creating advertising 
user models until after the Gmail user can retrieve the email in his or 
her mailbox using the Gmail interface; (3) for outgoing email, 
Google will refrain from any processing of email content that it 
applies prior to the point when the Gmail user can retrieve the 
outgoing email in his or her mailbox using the Gmail interface 
(currently, this occurs when the email is stored in the “Tingle” 
sever) that is used for the distinct purpose of advertising and 
creating advertising user models; and (4) with regard to any 
information generated by other processing of email content that 
Google applies before the Gmail user can retrieve the outgoing 
email in his or her mailbox using the Gmail interface, Google will 
not use or access such information for the purpose of serving 
targeted advertisements or creating advertising user models until 
after the Gmail user can retrieve the email in his or her mailbox 
using the Gmail interface. 
Notice, at 2.   
 This notice is difficult to understand and does not clearly disclose the fact that Google 
intercepts, scans, and analyzes the content of emails sent by non-Gmail users to Gmail users for 
the purpose of creating user profiles of the Gmail users to create targeted advertising for the Gmail 
users.  Moreover, the notice does not clearly disclose what technical changes the settlement 
requires.  At the preliminary approval hearing, the parties explained that the injunction would 
prohibit Google from scanning in transit email for the sole purpose of collecting advertising data, 
but would allow Google to scan incoming in transit email for the “dual purpose” of (1) detecting 
spam and malware and (2) obtaining information that would be “later used for advertising 
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purposes.”  H’rg Tr. at 26 (emphasis added).  Specifically, once the email is in storage, the 
injunction allows Google to access the “metadata generated during the spam scanning process”—
which was collected while the email was in transit—and use that metadata “for advertising 
purposes.”  Id. at 27 (emphasis added).  The “dual purpose” to which Plaintiff refers is not clearly 
disclosed in the notice to Class Members.  See Notice, at 2.   
 Further, it is not clear that the “dual purpose” will bring Google into compliance with the 
Wiretap Act and CIPA.  See Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1042 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
19, 2014) (noting that the “Wiretap Act protects communications in transit” and “generally 
prohibits the ‘interception’ of ‘wire, oral, or electronic communications’”); NovelPoster v. 
Javictch Canfield Grp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 938, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The analysis for a violation 
of CIPA is the same as that under the federal Wiretap Act.”).  Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
approval provides no authority as to whether or why the injunction’s “dual purpose” interception, 
scanning, and analysis of in transit emails brings Google into compliance with the Wiretap Act or 
CIPA.  See generally Mot. 
 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval.  The notice to 
Class Members, which is the only form of disclosure that Class Members will receive under the 
settlement, is inadequate.  The notice does not clearly disclose that Google intercepts, scans, and 
analyzes the content of emails sent by non-Gmail users to Gmail users for the purpose of creating 
user profiles of the Gmail users to create targeted advertising for the Gmail user.  It does not 
disclose that Google will scan the email of non-Gmail users while the emails are in transit for the 
“dual purpose” of creating user profiles and targeted advertising and for detecting spam and 
malware.  Moreover, because Plaintiffs’ motion cites no case law and provides no argument as to 
whether the “dual purpose” scanning permitted under the settlement is lawful under the Wiretap 
Act and CIPA, it is not clear to the Court at this time that the technical changes that the settlement 
provides brings Google into compliance with the Wiretap Act and CIPA, as Plaintiffs assert. 
 Plaintiffs continue to argue that this settlement is no different than the settlement in In re 
Yahoo Mail Litigation, 2016 WL 4474612 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016).  However, every case and 
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every settlement are different.  The Yahoo settlement took place after more than two years of 
litigation and a mere six days before the hearing on the parties’ fully briefed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  At the time of settlement, the Court had spent considerable time analyzing 
the parties’ summary judgment issues.  Moreover, the parties and the Court had much more 
information to assess the risks of litigation and determine whether the class action settlement was 
fair and reasonable under the circumstances.  Specifically, in Yahoo, the Court denied Yahoo’s 
motion to dismiss on August 12, 2014.  In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 
2014).  The parties completed fact discovery on May 1, 2015, and the Court certified an injunctive 
class and denied class certification of a damages class on May 26, 2015.  In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 
308 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  The parties completed expert discovery on August 28, 2015, 
and the parties briefed cross-motions for summary judgment from September 19, 2015 through 
November 16, 2015.  See In re Yahoo Mail Litig., Case No. 13-CV-04980-LHK, ECF Nos. 131 & 
135.  Furthermore, as the Court found in its order on Yahoo’s motion to dismiss, Yahoo disclosed 
in its Privacy Policy even before the Yahoo lawsuit was filed that Yahoo scanned non-Yahoo 
users’ email to Yahoo users.  See In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.  Moreover, the 
settlement in Yahoo included additional important disclosures regarding scanning of incoming and 
outgoing emails and the sharing of information with third parties.  See In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 
2016 WL 4474612, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016). 
 In the instant case, by contrast, the parties litigated only a motion to dismiss and a motion 
to stay before settlement.  The parties have not taken any depositions in this case, and Google has 
only produced documents from prior litigation.
3
  Specifically, the discovery in this case has 
consisted of 11 interrogatories and Plaintiffs’ review of documents from the In re Google Inc. 
Gmail Litigation, Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK.  The lead case in Gmail, Dunbar v. Google, was 
filed on November 17, 2010.  See Case No. 10-CV-194-LHK.  Fact discovery was scheduled to 
conclude in Gmail on May 23, 2014, which was also the date that a majority of the individual 
                                                 
3
 Class Counsel represents that their current lodestar is $1.25 million for this work.  H’rg Tr. at 52. 
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plaintiffs in Gmail stipulated to dismissal because this Court denied class certification on March 
18, 2014.  See Case No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, ECF No. 176.  Accordingly, discovery in Gmail was 
conducted between three and six years ago.  Plaintiffs’ use of discovery produced between three to 
six years ago is particularly questionable in this case given that the instant settlement requires 
Google to maintain the injunction’s technical changes for only three years because “the 
architecture and technical requirements for providing email services on a large scale evolve and 
change dynamically.”  Settlement Agreement ¶ 34.d.   
 Indeed, the discovery in Gmail illustrates how important depositions are in a case such as 
this.  In Gmail, it was not until the July 15, 2011 deposition of Thompson Alexander Ivor Gawley, 
Google’s senior product manager for the Gmail system, that Plaintiff Dunbar learned for the first 
time that Google was scanning and extracting information from non-Gmail users in the same way 
that Google was scanning and extracting emails received by Gmail users.  See Dunbar v. Google, 
2012 WL 6202797, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012).   
 In sum, based on the parties’ current filings, the Court cannot conclude that the settlement 
is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.”  Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.  Accordingly, for 
the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is 
DENIED.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: March 15, 2017 
______________________________________ 
LUCY H. KOH 
United States District Judge 
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